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Abstract: 
This article aims to provide elements to explain the feminisation of French MEPs. While the 
voting system should be taken into account, its effects can only be understood in relation with 
two elements: on the one hand, the position of the European Parliament in the French political 
field; on the other, the specific configuration of social and political struggles of the public 
space in 1990s France. Within this framework, gender constitutes a political resource that is 
more valuable in the European Parliament than in the national parliament; as a result, women 
who  are  less  politically  professionalised  are  promoted.  They  turn  towards  forms  of 
parliamentary “goodwill” and strategies of over-involvement in European political roles. The 
relative specificity of the postures they adopt within the institution does not have to do with a 
hypothetical “feminine nature”, but with a set of sociopolitical processes. 
 
Keywords: Gender and politics, MEPs, European elections, Political paths, Parliamentary 
work, Parliamentary activities. 
 
Résumé : 
Cet article vise à apporter des éléments d’explication quant à la féminisation des élus français 
au Parlement européen. S’il semble nécessaire de prendre en compte le mode de scrutin, ses 
effets  ne  peuvent  se  comprendre  qu’en  relation  avec  deux  éléments :  d’une  part  avec  la 
position  du  Parlement  européen  dans  le  champ  politique  français ;  d’autre  part  avec  la 
configuration propre des luttes sociales et politiques qui traversent l’espace public français au 
cours des années 1990. C’est dans ce cadre que le genre constitue une ressource politique plus 
rentable  au  Parlement  européen  qu’au  parlement  français,  avec  pour  conséquence  la 
promotion de femmes moins familiarisées avec l’exercice du métier politique. Des femmes 
qui de ce fait s’orientent davantage vers des formes de « bonne volonté » parlementaire et des 
stratégies  de  surinvestissement  des  rôles  politiques  européens.  La  spécificité  relative  des 
postures qu’elles adoptent au sein de l’institution renvoie donc moins à une hypothétique 
« nature féminine », qu’à un ensemble de processus sociopolitiques.  
 
Mots-clés : Genre et politique, Députés européens, Elections européennes, Trajectoires 
politiques, Travail parlementaire. 
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Introduction  
 
The European Parliament (EP) has one of 
the  highest  proportions  of  women  in 
Europe.  However,  gender  parity  is  still  a 
long  way  off.  By  late  2006,  before  the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European  Union,  women  made  up  just 
under a third of the assembly (30.4%). The 
voting  system  is  the  first  variable  to  be 
considered in terms of explaining the high 
representation of women in this assembly. 
The  party-list  proportional  representation 
single-round voting, practised in 22 out of 
25  EU  countries  in  2004  (Stöver,  Wüst, 
2005), is more conducive to the election of 
women  (Matland,  1998;  Matland, 
Montgomery, 2003; Norris, 2004). 
 
However, the voting system variable does 
not  completely  account  for  this.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  are  considerable 
variations between countries, even between 
countries  with  similar  voting  systems. 
There are fewer women among the MEPs 
of  Cyprus,  Poland,  Italy,  Czech  Republic 
and Latvia. Inversely, in Sweden (the only 
country  with  equal  numbers  of  men  and 
women),  the  Netherlands,  Denmark, 
Estonia  and  France,  over  40%  of  MEPs 
elected to serve in Strasbourg are women. 
In this regard, recent works (Tremblay et 
al., 2007) put into perspective the role of 
other variables; especially political parties 
and  political  situations,  as  well  as 
interactions  between  political  order  and 
social  order.  In  addition  to  these,  this 
article  will  attempt  to  show  that  the 
causality  between  the  voting  system  and 
the proportion of women is less dependent 
on  the  near-automatic  consequences  of 
legal  rules  than  the  logic  that  shapes  the 
interplay  of  political  configurations  – 
without  which  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  the  concrete  effect  of  voting 
systems.  A  multi-dimensional  analysis  of 
political  recruitment  (Nay,  2001)  based 
concurrently on the “strategies of political 
actors”  and  the  “institutional  constraints 
imposed by all (formal or informal) rules 
which govern political life” (Nay, 1998, p. 
168),  appear  heuristic  in  this  context. 
Judging  by  this  perspective,  regional 
elections  in  France,  for  example,  are 
characterised  by  the  fact  that  in 
constituting party lists, balance in terms of 
“requirements of social representativeness” 
– especially in relation to gender – is taken 
into  account.  Elections  are  also 
characterised  by  the  promotion  of 
representatives  who  are,  a  priori,  less 
likely to be given elective responsibilities. 
Moreover, it is imperative to question the 
implications of the exercise of power. For 
instance,  to  what  extent  are  women 
confined  to  certain  sectors  of  legislative 
activity,  as  is  the  case  with  other 
assemblies (Achin, 2005)? Furthermore, do 
men  monopolise  positions  of  power?  Do 
women  play  their  role  as  MEPs 
differently?  And  finally,  is  this  
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characteristic of “feminine specificity”,
1 as 
claimed in certain quarters? 
 
In  order  to  shed  some  light  on  the 
combined effects of the voting system and 
other variables on the election of women 
and the exercise of European power, this 
article  will  concentrate  on  analysing  the 
French  delegation  to  the  European 
Parliament for several reasons. First of all, 
the  large  proportion  of  women  in  the 
French  delegation  (42.3%)  in  Strasbourg 
ranks fifth out of the twenty-seven national 
delegations,
2 which is an unexpected fact. 
Indeed,  unlike  Sweden,  the  Netherlands 
and  Denmark,  where  the  high  number  of 
women  elected  to  national  parliaments  is 
similar to that in the European Parliament, 
this is not the case with France.  Overall, 
France  has  a  particularly  low  number  of 
women in elective positions at the various 
decision-making  levels;  only  10.9%  of 
mayors  elected  in  the  2001  municipal 
elections  were  women,  3%  of  the 
presidents  of  departmental  councils  in 
2003, and 18.5% members of the National 
Assembly in 2007. This places the French 
Parliament in 18
th position among the 27 
member  countries  of  the  Union.
3  In  this 
context,  the  European  Parliament  is  an 
exception.  In  the  case  of  France,  the 
proportion  of  women  elected  to  the 
European Parliament is a phenomenon that 
                                                 
1 “Women don’t like confrontation as much as men 
–  that’s  the  only  real  difference  between  them. 
Women  prefer  to  find  agreement,  to  discuss  and 
find practical solutions” (cited by Vallance, Davies, 
1986). On the study of the feminine art of politics 
see: Guionnet, 2002. 
2 The law on parity, which tends to promote equal 
access to electoral mandated and elected posts for 
men and women, has however not led to complete 
parity. The chief candidates were most often men 
(only  17  women  in  the  54  lists  presented). 
Additionally, one or two resignations resulted in the 
election  of  men,  thus  changing  the  initial 
proportions. This was the case of Chantal Simonot, 
who resigned from the National Front (FN) list and 
was replaced by Fernand Rachine. 
3  http://www.observatoire-parite.gouv.fr/  accessed 
on 14 January 2007. 
is  both  exceptional  –  given  the  small 
proportion  of  women  elected  to  other 
French political assemblies – and relatively 
old.  The  Law  of  6  June  2000,  which 
imposes  gender  parity  in  political 
elections
4 in France, does not alone explain 
it. Between 1979 and 2004, women made 
up a quarter of all MEPs. This number has 
however been increasing at every election, 
especially  after  the  fourth  legislature 
(1994-1999),  rising  from  22%  of  French 
representatives  in  1979,  to  27%  between 
1994 and 1999, to 41% between 1999 and 
2004  (figure  1).  All  these  elections  were 
held before the law on parity was passed.
5 
 
The feminisation of the French component 
of the European Parliament is therefore a 
particularly  striking  phenomenon.  This 
exception  constitutes  an  enigma  that  the 
literature  cannot  completely  solve.  Of 
course, the large number of women in the 
European  Parliament,  particularly  in  the 
left-wing  parties,  has  often  been 
underscored  by  various  works  on  the 
socio-political representativeness of MEPs 
(Vallance, Davies, 1986; Norris, Franklin, 
1977;  Hix,  Lord,  1997;  Bryder,  1998; 
Norris,  1999;  Mather,  2001;  Freedman, 
2002).  For  all  that,  and  in  spite  of  the 
specificities mentioned above, the problem 
of “women in politics” received very little 
attention  in  the  more  specific  study  of 
French women in the European Parliament 
– except in very rare cases (Kauppi, 1999). 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse these 
main  issues  in  the  context  of  certain 
questions:  To  what  extent  did  the 
institutional  rules  governing  European 
elections in France favour the promotion of 
women? Moreover, by extension, what are 
                                                 
4 Act 2000-493 of 6 June 2000, the law on parity, 
which  tends  to  promote  equal  access  to  electoral 
mandates  and  elected  posts  for  men  and  women, 
J.O n°131 of 7 June 2000, p. 8560. 
5  Figures  provided  in  2006  by  the  Parity 
Observatory,  http://www.observatoire-
parite.gouv.fr/. Concerning the place of women in 
French  politics  see,  in  particular,  the  works  of 
Mariette Sineau, 2001.  
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the consequences on the work of European 
politicians?  
 
Although it may be necessary to take into 
account the voting system, its effects can 
not  be  completely  understood  except  in 
relation  to  the  position  of  the  European 
Parliament in the political field in France 
on the one hand; and, on the other hand, 
the  very  configuration  of  the  social  and 
political  struggles  that  characterised 
French public life in the 1990s. It is within 
this  framework  that  gender  became  a 
political  resource  more  profitable  to  the 
European  Parliament  than  to  the  French 
Parliament,  resulting  in  the  promotion  of 
women who were new to politics. In effect, 
these  women  turned  more  towards  forms 
of  parliamentary  “goodwill”  and  the 
strategy  of  over-involvement  of  roles  in 
European  politics.  The  relatively  specific 
postures  adopted  by  women  within  the 
institution  are  less  about  a  hypothetical 
“feminine  nature”  than  a  set  of  socio-
political processes that this article intends 
to  reconstruct.  In  order  to  validate  these 
hypotheses,  we  first  conducted  a 
quantitative survey on all MEPs elected in 
France  between  1979  and  2004.  In  total, 
they numbered 369 people: 92 women and 
277  men.  We  systematically  coded  their 
socio-demographic  characteristics  (age, 
sex,  social  status,  level  and  type  of 
education,  father’s  occupation),  political 
characteristics (previous mandates, number 
of local and national mandates, length of 
career,  age  at  first  term,  concurrent 
mandates)  and  various  indicators  of  their 
involvement  in  the  assembly  (type  of 
parliamentary  committee,  leadership 
position).  This  material  is  further 
complemented  by  data  gathered  and 
processed  on  sitting  MEPs  –  elected  in 
2004 – and through more than a hundred 
interviews  conducted  between  1998  and 
2007  with  MEPs  and  their  parliamentary 
aides. 
 
Subsequently, this study will be separated 
into three parts: firstly, part 1 will focus on 
the  characteristics  of  the  political 
competition  for  the  European  mandate  in 
France;  secondly,  part  2  will  put  into 
perspective  gender  as  a  specific  political 
resource;  and  finally,  part  3  will  explain 
women’s involvement in the assembly with 
regard to their dispositions. 
 
 
(1)  Increased  openness  and 
heterodoxy  of  European  political 
competition in France 
 
Several additional factors help explain the 
emergence  of  gender  on  the  European 
political  market  (Beauvallet,  Michon, 
2008).  The  first  of  these  factors  is  the 
voting  system.  However,  by  defining 
specific  legal  guidelines,  more  than 
prescribing  political  practices,  it 
contributes to establish specific structures 
of  constraints  and  opportunities  which  in 
turn  influence  the  strategies  deployed  by 
the  actors.  Although  the  voting  system 
offers  a  range  of  possibilities,  it  is  not  a 
sufficient explanation for the modalities of 
recruitment  within  Europe  and  its 
increased  openness.  In  addition  to  the 
voting system, there is the influence of the 
European  Parliament’s  position  in  the 
French  political  field,  and  of  the  current 
political situation.  
 
The voting system and the position of 
the European Parliament in the French 
political field 
 
The characteristics of the European voting 
system  in  France  and  the  specificities 
linked to the position of the parliamentary 
space  in  the  arenas  of  politics  or  media 
primarily  interact  to  provide  political 
recruitment  within  Europe  with  a  more 
open  character  than  on  the  national 
markets. The criteria for political selection 
therein can be partially modified. 
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Regarding  the  voting  system  in  France 
until  2004,  several  factors  contributed  to 
bring  about  this  openness.  Within  the 
parties,  the  proportional  voting  list 
primarily favours the expression of modes 
of legitimacy and the mobilisation of more 
diversified resources. At the same time, it 
underscores the role and weight of partisan 
administrative staff that are responsible for 
constituting  the  lists  and,  especially, 
distributing  eligible  positions.  Whereas 
regional  elections,  with  their  list-based 
proportional  voting  system  in  the 
departmental  constituency,  favour 
departmental  political  administrative  staff 
(Nay,  1998),  the  uniqueness  of  the 
electoral  constituency  European  elections 
reinforces  the  importance  of  national 
partisan  administrative  staff.  The  latter 
settle internal exchanges and conflicts over 
eligible  positions  that  characterise  pre-
election periods. Thirdly, in the absence of 
a run-off, the principle of pure proportional 
representation  and  the  relatively  low 
threshold  for  the  acquisition  of  seats, 
which  also  governs  the  process  of  state 
sponsorship  of  electoral  campaigns  (5%), 
are  factors  that  encourage  more  marginal 
political competitors to enter the electoral 
battle, thus engendering the proliferation of 
lists. As a result of the greater number of 
candidates,  competition  between 
organisations is intensified, given that the 
minor  lists  apply  greater  pressure  on  the 
dominant political organisations. 
 
Apart  from  existing  electoral  rules,  the 
political recruitment system made explicit 
in  European  politics  also  presupposes 
consideration for the effects linked to the 
position of the European Parliament in the 
French  political  configuration.  This 
relatively recent institution was, for many 
years,  seen  as  peripheral  in  the  French 
political  field.  While  benefiting  from  a 
certain  degree  of  prestige  due  to  its 
international nature, it is still considered to 
be an essentially “technical” entity that is 
not  political  enough,  i.e.,  “cut  off”  from 
citizens  and  even  “without  real  political 
power”.  Its  very  principle  contradicts  the 
most sacred of political conceptions: those 
that  associate  every  notion  of 
representation with a national framework, 
with which the Parliament of Strasbourg is 
inevitably out of step. These two types of 
distance from the centre, both political and 
geographical,  have  generated  ambiguous 
reports from politicians and journalists in 
the past. 
 
These relations are typical of an institution 
that  has  very  little  political  legitimacy. 
Although  for  “end-of-career”  elected 
representatives it is a prestigious institution 
(precisely  because  it  is  international  and 
therefore remote), more “settled” political 
players  despise  it  to  the  extent  that  they 
sometimes  even  decline  to  run  as 
candidates.  When  they  do,  they  resign 
before  the  end  of  their  term,  or  hold  the 
parliamentary  seat  concurrently  with 
another  political  mandate  and/or  to 
compensate for their relative past failures 
in the national political field. For example, 
30%  of  the  MEPs  elected  in  France 
between  1979  and  2004  resigned  before 
the end of their mandate,
6 while 70% held 
another mandate simultaneously. For many 
years,  the  position  of  a  MEP  was 
considered to be a temporary and unstable 
one,  an  interim  post  or  end-of-career 
mandate.  It  is  in  this  context  of  relative 
disaffection for the national political elite 
that  EP  positions  came  to  be  seen  as  an 
alternative  point  of  access  to  a  career  in 
politics.  Indeed,  it  was  seen  as  an 
alternative space by many actors for whom 
                                                 
6  Apart  from  the  practice  of  the  ‘revolving 
door’ (i.e.,  MEPs  resigning  halfway  through  their 
mandate in order to make room for their successors 
on  the  list),  which  characterised  RPR  (former 
UMP) parliamentarians in the first legislature and 
the  Greens  in  the  third,  it  is  especially 
representatives  elected  as  deputies  (Lienemann, 
Novelli) or senators (Karoutchi, Raffarin), or those 
with  a  ministerial  portfolio  (Fontaine,  Saïfi)  who 
exit the Parliament. 
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the  opportunity  to  hold  more  mainstream 
positions  at  local  and  national  levels  had 
been  compromised,  owing  to  implicit 
norms  and  the  strong  restrictive  effects 
which  characterise  selection  to  political 
office  at  the  various  levels.  From  the 
1990s,  MEPs  were,  de  facto,  younger, 
more  endowed  in  terms  of  political 
resources, more often present, more active, 
more “professional”, and there had been a 
higher  proportion  of  women  (Beauvallet, 
2007). They contributed to institutionalise 
the  mandate,  to  differentiate  between 
European  and  national  paths,  and  to 
redefine  the  modalities  under  which  it  is 
exercised. It is therefore not surprising that 
in France, as in other Europeans countries, 
the  major  names  in  the  European 
Parliament are elected representatives who 
are little known in the political arenas of 
their countries (P. Bérès, J-L. Bourlanges, 
J. Daul, N. Fontaine, N. Pery). 
 
The  circular  effect  produced  by  a 
decentred  political  position  and 
unfavourable subjective appreciations from 
major  political  actors,  as  well  as  from 
media and academic circles, made voting 
practices  in  European  elections  quite 
specific  (Reif,  Schmitt,  1980).  Votes  in 
European  elections  are  more  fragmented 
than the “primaries” whose issues are the 
most  central  positions  of  the  field,  i.e., 
those  leading  to  the  formation  of  “a  true 
government”.  Although  the  rate  of 
abstention  is  high  in  European  elections, 
they regularly produce new party lists and 
political organisations which generally do 
not  perform)  as  well  in  the  French 
parliamentary  and  presidential  elections, 
for  example,  the  ‘national  sovereignty’ 
parties  like  those  of  Philippe  de  Villiers 
and Charles Pasqua, or the right-wing party 
Chasse,  Pêche,  Nature  et  Tradition 
(CPNT)  (Hunting,  Fishing,  Nature  and 
Tradition).  However,  in  certain  cases, 
European elections constituted one of the 
first  steps  to  institutionalising  new 
movements  or  parties  like  the  National 
Front (FN) or the Greens. These parties are 
partly made up of newcomers to the French 
political scene who are often portrayed as 
emerging from “civil society”, as opposed 
to  a  compartmentalised  political  arena. 
Given that it is sometimes difficult to draw 
a  line  between  political  organisation  and 
interest  group,  as  in  the  case  of  CPNT, 
these “small” lists have contributed to the 
emergence  of  new  issues  on  the  political 
arena, including feminisation. 
 
In comparison with the logic that governs 
the  national  markets,  the  politically 
peripheral nature of the EP translates into 
the  more  heterodox  nature  of  political 
competition – given that the latter appears 
to  be  more  open,  more  receptive  to  the 
various issues of the French public domain 
– and into political recruitment that is more 
open  or,  arguably,  less  closed.  This  was 
especially  relevant  during  the  1990s  as 
there was renewed interest in the theme of 
gender equality in the public domain, and 
women,  among  others,  were  the  first 
beneficiaries of this openness in terms of 
recruitment into European politics. 
 
Concrete  recruitment  rules  and 
practices  
 
These  different  characteristics  of  the 
European  political  market  also  encourage 
parties to respect a balance that is supposed 
to  define  the  modalities  governing  the 
allocation of eligible positions on electoral 
lists; but which themselves depend on the 
general  configuration  of  struggles  that 
characterise partisan spaces, or the political 
field more generally (Nay, 1998). 
 
Referring to the partially rewritten norms 
governing access to elective positions, the 
definition of this balance initially aimed at 
regulating the internal tensions within the 
parties.  They  also  help  political  leaders 
stay  directly  in  tune  with  issues  in  the 
public and political domains (e.g., “better 
social  representativeness”,  “balance  
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between  cultural  identities”),  either 
because  they  consider  these  issues  as 
constraints  which  need  to  be  addressed 
especially as, in their opinion, they cannot 
be addressed in the framework of standard 
elections;  or  because  they  identify  these 
issues  with  electoral  opportunity,  with 
occasions for presenting a more diversified 
political  supply  that  is  better  adjusted  to 
more  fragmented  electoral  behaviours. 
Finally,  by  defining  new  norms,  this 
balance  defines  new  opportunities  and 
leads to the development of new political 
resources, sometimes in way that contrasts 
with  the  prevailing  situation  in  other 
political markets. 
 
 Three  major  types  of  balance  can  be 
identified  in  the  case  of  European 
elections, the first of which serves internal 
purposes.  In  the  framework  of  a  single 
national  constituency  (in  existence  until 
2004),  its  purpose  was  to  regulate  the 
tensions  created  by  various  territorial  or 
political legitimacies. The list must display 
a  balanced  representativeness  of  the 
political regions and movements that make 
up  the  party  or  coalition  of  parties.  The 
second type of balance seeks to moderate 
“incoming”  and  “outgoing”  MEPs. 
Although  the  legitimacy  of  incumbent 
MEPs  rarely  conferred  a  tacit  right  to 
renewal  of  mandate  (unlike  the  situation 
with  parliamentary  elections),  the  latter 
tend  to  be  progressively  accepted.
7  The 
major  partisan  organisations  are 
increasingly  concerned  about  balancing 
“incoming”  and  “outgoing” 
parliamentarians, thus displaying a form of 
“Europeanisation” of the implicit rules or 
norms  of  accession  to  the  mandate.  The 
third  type  of  balance  is  more  directly 
related  to  the  sociological  issues  which 
                                                 
7 Within the French delegation, 36% of MEPs in the 
fourth  legislature  (1994-1999)  have  had  already 
been elected to the European Parliament, 40% of 
those of the fifth legislature (1999-2004), and in the 
last  European  elections  in  2004,  48%  of  elected 
representatives were incumbent. 
occur outside of the internal party games. 
This  was  primarily  the  case  of  a  regular 
practice  that  was  aimed  at  reserving 
eligible  positions  for  people  seen  as 
“socio-professionals”. What was supposed 
to  be  a  voluntarist  practice  of  openness 
towards “civil society” became a feature of 
all  lists,  more  specifically,  of  small  lists, 
incoming  or  protest  lists.  For  example, 
they were evident on the list presented by 
Philippe de Villiers in 1994, and on that of 
the  Communist  Party  in  1999.
8 
Furthermore,  there  is  the  case  of  the 
attention given to representation by groups 
considered as ethnic minorities. Although 
this concern was emphasised in the case of 
Britain (Norris, Lovenduski, 1995), it bears 
a resemblance to the practices of political 
actors  during  European  and  municipal 
elections in France as well – even though 
the  actors  deny  these  practices.
9  Finally, 
this  is  evident  in  the  practices  associated 
with  the  concern  for  gender  balance. 
Primarily  characteristic  of  left-wing 
parties,  these  practices  have  been 
spreading  after  1994  in  a  very  specific 
context. 
 
Concerning  the  inevitable  opening-up  to 
“visible minorities”, the affirmation of this 
balance  of  gender  in  the  constitution  of 
European  lists  can  be  understood  in 
reference to the emergence (or resurgence) 
of a “problem” in the 1990s: a new issue to 
which  the  specific  structure  of  the 
European  political  market  will  provide 
answers;  and  to  whose  affirmation  it 
equally  continued  to  contribute  until  the 
final vote on the Law of June 2000 (which 
made gender parity compulsory in political 
elections).  The  debate  over  parity  that 
raged  in  France  in  the  1990s  must  be 
                                                 
8 Examples include: the entrepreneur J. Goldsmith; 
Judge Jean-Pierre on the de Villiers list in 1994; the 
philosopher G. Fraisse; and the former president of 
SOS Racisme, F. Sylla on the Hue list in 1999. 
9 Indeed, the French republican integration model 
often  hides  the  ethnicisation  practices  of  the 
political corps (Geisser, 1997).  
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considered  in  light  of  the  return  of  the 
feminist  question  after  its  decline  in  the 
1980s  (Achin,  Lévêque,  2000),  which 
particularly  questions  the 
representativeness  of  social  and  political 
elites.
10  Linked  to  the  position  of  the 
European  Parliament  in  the  French 
political  arena  and  to  the  existing  voting 
system, the heterodox customs of election 
constructed by organisations – aspirants to 
the  political  market  –  participated  in 
placing  this  new  issue  on  the  political 
agenda. In this regard, as from 1989, parity 
became another dimension of the political 
choice proposed by the Greens. The party 
adopted the rule during elections, in which 
they were highly visible, and finished by 
winning  their  first  major  seats. 
Marginalised and subjected to competition 
by  the  charismatic  list  of  Bernard  Tapie, 
and  forced  into  practices  likely  to  re-
mobilise  its  potential  electorate,  the 
Socialist Party, then led by Michel Rocard, 
also adopted the parity rule in 1994. Since 
then, feminisation in the left-wing parties 
in European elections is understood to be 
the unwritten rule of political recruitment 
to  the  European  Parliament.  After  that 
election,  and  particularly  after  1999, 
feminisation  of  European  lists  became  a 
political issue, with organisations basically 
obliged to develop a specific choice in this 
respect, and to demonstrate their ability to 
feminise  their  lists.    In  fact,  after  1999, 
parity became a near-systematic constraint, 
and most parties anticipated that the Law 
of June 2000 would make theses practices 
compulsory.  At  the  risk  of  being 
considered  as  averse  to  any  form  of 
modernity and the new standards of gender 
equality in politics, all organisations strive 
to  ensure  better  representation  of  women 
on party lists. This new rule helped in the 
emergence  of  a  new  structure  of 
constraints  and  opportunities,  which 
partially  modified  earlier  recruitment 
                                                 
10 The increasing number of works in recent years 
on the place of women in politics - both in French 
and English literature - attests to this. 
practices  (Latté,  2002).  For  some 
organisations  (FN,  CPNT,  the  lists  of 
Charles  Pasqua  and  Philippe  de  Villiers), 
this  constraint  may  turn  out  to  be 
particularly  difficult  to  manage.
11 
Nevertheless,  the  ability  to  feminise 
political  personnel  remains  a  crucial 
precondition  for  full  inclusion  in  the 
‘game’, not just in financial matters. This 
seems  to  be  a  new  norm  for  political 
competition,  as  CPNT  parliamentarian, 
Michel Raymond, fully expresses, insisting 
on  his  party’s  ability  to  comply  with  the 
new constraints in the 2002 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
 
 “We’ll  probably  try  to  cover  as  many 
constituencies  as  possible,  400  to  500 
probably, and we’ll do that with parity, too. 
We  have  a  macho  image…  that’s  it,  we’ll 
ensure  parity.  We’ll  be  the  only  ones 
practising  parity,  with  the  Greens,  by  the 
way.  The  other  political  parties  have 
declared  they  would  not  go  with  parity; 
François  Hollande  called  a  press 
conference…Because  non-compliance  with 
parity  in  legislative  elections  attracts 
financial  sanctions  and  as  the  money  they 
receive  is  already…  They’d  rather  tighten 
their  belt  than  practise  parity  which  they 
approved  and  demanded.  Now,  there  is 
going to be a huge fight over that (…) and 
then, it’s a way of making people see… Me, I 
am against parity, my colleague and I we’re 
against,  I  can’t  understand  how  they  can 
impose parity but rules are rules and since 
there  is  a  rule,  we’ll  obey  it  to  the  fullest 
extent... Good, we’ll show we can do it (…). 
At  last,  we’ll  do  it  to  prove…  to  send  a 
strong signal to the outside” (Interview with 
Michel Raymond, September 2001).  
 
 
Although the voting system is a factor to 
be taken into consideration in studying the 
feminisation  of  the  French  delegation  to 
the European Parliament, its importance is 
dependent on several other factors, namely, 
the  rather  peripheral  position  of  the 
European  Parliament  in  French  politics, 
                                                 
11  These  party  lists  had  the  lowest  number  of 
women in 1999.  
GSPE Working Papers – Willy BEAUVALLET & Sébastien MICHON – 10/28/2008  9 
and the general emergence of “parity” as 
an issue in the public space. Subsequently, 
it is necessary to specify the consequences 
of  this  process  for  the  characteristics  of 
parliamentarians  and  the  exercise  of  the 
mandate. 
 
 
(2) Is gender a political resource? 
 
The  feminisation  of  European  political 
personnel, not only in France but in other 
countries as well, originally began with the 
left-wing parties (Norris, Franklin, 1997, p. 
193). In 1979, women made up 22% of the 
socialist and communist component of the 
French  delegation.  The  initial  rate  of 
feminisation  of  personnel  of  the  Greens, 
the  Socialist  Party  and  the  French 
Communist  party  has  continued  to 
increase:  26.5%  in  1984;  32%  in  1989; 
42% in 1994; and 49% in 1999. Four out 
of the five parliamentarians elected on the 
LO-LCR
12 list were women. On the other 
hand, feminisation of political personnel of 
right-wing  parties  occurred  later  and 
randomly.  From  18%  in  the  first 
legislature, it fell to 14.5% in the second, 
and  then  as  low  as  12%  in  the  third 
legislature.  It  rose  again  in  1994  (16%), 
and reached 31% between 1999 and 2004, 
thus gradually catching up with the levels 
that  are  characteristic  of  the  left.  In 
contrast with the traditionally low numbers 
of women in French political institutions, 
the  high  proportion  of  women  elected  to 
the European Parliament calls into question 
the  mechanisms  for  selecting  and 
recruiting  French  representatives  to  the 
European  Parliament.  Unlike  other 
assemblies,  gender  constitutes  a  positive 
and  distinctive  attribute  in  the  European 
Parliament.  Younger  than  their  male 
counterparts and less endowed with social 
                                                 
12  The  LO  &  LCR,  respectively:  Lutte  ouvrière 
[Workers’  Struggle];  Ligue  communiste 
révolutionnaire  [Revolutionary  Communist 
League]. Both ran as joint candidates in the 2004 
regional and European elections. 
resources,  women  representatives  in  the 
European  Parliament  also  have  fewer 
political  mandates,  especially  the  most 
legitimate ones. 
  
Younger  and  socio-culturally  less 
endowed women 
 
Women were first of all younger than their 
male  counterparts  (table  1).  This 
phenomenon was observed during the third 
legislature. In fact, the advent of younger 
women participated in the rejuvenation of 
French representatives. Not only are there 
more women in the left but they are also 
younger than women in the right (table 2). 
While  less  than  one  in  ten  women  left-
wing  representatives  is  over  the  age  of 
sixty,  the  figure  for  their  right-wing 
counterparts is nearly four in ten. 
 
Given their socio-cultural attributes – the 
second  set  of  indicators  –  European 
women  representatives  largely  belong  to 
the upper segments of the social spectrum, 
which  is  no  different  from  the  men  and 
typical  of  all  MEPs  as  well  as  national 
political  elites.  However,  through  their 
social  attributes,  women  are  better 
represented than their male counterparts in 
the  recent  cultural  fractions  of  the  upper 
categories.  They  often  have  fewer 
university  graduates (6.5% against 12.5% 
for  men),  fewer  company  directors  (1% 
against  10%)  fewer  senior  civil  servants 
(5.5% against 18.5%). On the other hand, 
they  are  more  often  senior  executives  in 
civil service (6.5% against 3%), secondary 
school teachers (11% against 6.5%), school 
teachers or educators (6.5% against 1.5%). 
Moreover, although outnumbered by men, 
women have a higher representation in the 
intermediary  and  working-class  social 
categories  (13%  against  6%  and  7.5% 
against  4.5%  respectively);  especially 
middle-level  executives,  white-collar  and 
blue-collar workers (table 3). 
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Partisan differences, which are significant, 
confirm  the  classic  logic  of  political 
recruitment  for  women  (Gaxie,  1980) – 
obviously  femininity  does  not  hide  the 
social  cleavages  within  the  political 
spectrum.  Women  recruited  on  left-wing 
lists are very often from the public sector 
and from the upper categories, dominated 
by  intellectual  professions,  such  as 
academics  (10%  of  left-wing 
parliamentarians against 2.5% in the right), 
secondary  school  teachers  (16%  against 
5%),  schoolteachers  or  educators  (10% 
against 2.5%). It is also the left that has the 
highest  proportion  of  parliamentarians 
from the lower stratum of the social sphere 
(12%  against  2.5%).  This  observation 
largely applies to men (tables 3 and 4).  
 
A  close  look  at  educational  careers  and 
qualifications leads to similar conclusions: 
French  women  elected  to  the  European 
Parliament  are  less  endowed  than  their 
male colleagues in terms of education. For 
example,  fewer  women  are  graduates  of 
either IEPs (Institutes of Political Science) 
(12% against 22.5%), or higher education 
institutes  (15%  against  31%),  or  the 
prestigious  Ecole  Nationale 
d’administration (ENA) (3% against 10%, 
see table 7). Although a high proportion of 
women  certainly  possess  a  university 
education,  they  are  still  less  endowed  in 
terms of educational capital. Fewer women 
hold a doctorate degree (17% against 22% 
for  men)  or  a  postgraduate  certificate 
(38.5%  against  55%);  while  a  higher 
proportion  of  women  are  first  degree 
holders  (32%  against  21.5%).  Clearly, 
there  is  a  strong  contingent  of  secondary 
school  teachers  in  Socialist  Party  and 
among the Greens. 
 
The distribution of social and educational 
properties  between  left-wing  and  right-
wing parliamentarians also appears mixed. 
Indeed,  right-wing  female  MEPs  –  like 
their  male  counterparts  –  have  less 
educational  capital  (33%  hold  a 
postgraduate  certificate  against  44%  of 
left-wing parliamentarians; 12% and 22% 
respectively  have  a  doctorate  degree,  see 
table 4). In relation to the economic realm, 
they  build  their  political  careers  by  re-
deployment  of  local  notabilities.  On  the 
other  hand,  although  left-wing  female 
parliamentarians appear to be lower on the 
social hierarchy from an economic point of 
view,  it  is  obvious  that  their  social  and 
political careers are built mostly by making 
use  of  their  educational  capital  (30%  of 
them  have  been  teachers  against  10%  of 
their  right-wing  counterparts;  35%  and 
11% respectively for men, see table 3).  
 
Politically less endowed women 
   
Political paths are also split along gender 
lines.  According  to  a  number  published 
works,  French  women  elected  to  the 
European Parliament have turned out to be 
less  endowed  with  symbolic  properties 
(only  30%  of  women  have  at  least  one 
publication to their name against 43% of 
men),  international  decorations  (4% 
against  12%),  national  decorations  (17% 
against  32%),  sector-specific  decorations 
such as academic prizes, or the Agriculture 
Award  (11.5%  against  31%).  Judging  by 
the  right-left  axis,  left-wing  female 
parliamentarians are more prolific in terms 
of  publications  than  their  right-wing 
counterparts. On the other hand, the latter 
are  often  more  decorated  (32%  of  right-
wing  female  parliamentarians  have  one 
national  decoration  against  6%  of  their 
left-wing counterparts).  
 
Women also possess less political capital, 
as  shown  by  the  elective  mandate 
indicators (table 8). Upon their entry into 
the  EP,  the  political  careers  of  women, 
both  at  national  and  local  levels,  are 
shorter than those of men (4% of female 
parliamentarians  have  a  national  career 
spanning more than 15 years against 19 % 
of  male  parliamentarians;  while  15%  of 
women have a local career spanning more  
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than 15 years against 28% of men). Fewer 
women  have  held  government  positions 
(14%  against  20%  of  their  male 
colleagues),  national  mandates  (81%  of 
them have had no mandate against 55% of 
men),  local  mandates  (37%  have  never 
held a local mandate against 30% of men), 
whether as general councillor (17% against 
35%) or president of a regional or general 
council  (2%  against  10%),  or  mayor 
(11.5%  against  33%).  However,  the  gaps 
between  men  and  women  either  open  or 
close  towards  the  bottom  of  the  mandate 
hierarchy  –  29.5%  of  women  have  been 
regional councillors against 42.5% of men; 
44.5%  of  women  have  been  municipal 
councillors or deputy mayor against 33.5% 
of men;  while 10%  have been substitute 
parliamentarians  against  7.5%.  The  mode 
of career entry confirms the lower level of 
political capital. The late entry of women 
into politics (4% of them file for their first 
candidacy before 30 years against 15% of 
men; 40% are elected to their first mandate 
before the age of 40 against 54%) usually 
follows  a  tenure  in  the  political  system 
(34% against 27.5% of men), rather than a 
term  in  a  politico-administrative  cabinet 
(especially ministerial) (14% against 17%). 
For 12% of women, the European mandate 
is  their  inaugural  political  experience 
against 5% of men.  
 
Another example of the left-right divide is 
that right-wing female representatives have 
more  often  been  ministers  (19%  against 
10% in the left) or parliamentarians (19% 
against  12.5%),  although  they  have  less 
often  been  mayors  (7%  against  16%). 
Female representatives from the left have 
more often held their first political office in 
a  party  (50%  against  17%  on  the  right), 
while those on the right instead began as a 
MEP  (19%  against  6%).  Once  again,  the 
numbers  are  similar  for  men  (table  5). 
Finally, left-wing female parliamentarians 
are more prolific in terms of publications 
than their counterparts on the right. On the 
other hand, the latter have more often been 
decorated  (32%  of  women  on  the  right 
have  national  decorations  against  6%  on 
the left). 
 
The  distribution  of  previous  mandates, 
modalities for entering the political career 
and  symbolic  properties  are  indicative  of 
differentiation  based  on  the  gender  of 
parliamentarians with  women  being  less 
endowed with political capital. For women, 
the  European  mandate  is  more  often  an 
opportunity  for  political 
professionalisation.  More  specifically, 
being a woman on the left very often goes 
with educational resources and a career in 
a party while on the right, being a woman 
goes  with  resources  acquired  in  political 
competitions, often in the shadows of local 
and national leaders. However, these gaps 
are equally found, for the most part, in the 
case of men. 
 
 
(3)  Dispositions  to  work  in  the 
European Parliament 
 
An in situ observation of incumbent female 
MEPs extends the earlier reflection on the 
modalities  of  their  election,  and 
emphasises the social logic that underpins 
the  exercise  of  the  mandate  and  the 
construction  of  European  parliamentary 
roles. 
 
A  study  of  the  overall  practices  initially 
shows  that  gender  is  of  little  relevance 
when  it  comes  to  attaining  internal 
achievements  of  the  institution.  The 
promotion  of  gender  on  the  European 
political  market  therefore  in  part  stems 
from  its  manipulation  by  partisan 
organisations for electoral purposes. Based 
on seniority, access to leadership positions 
(e.g.,  the  presidency,  vice-presidency  of 
committees and groups, or membership in 
the  European  Parliament  bureau)  and 
presentation of parliamentary reports vary 
significantly  according  to  gender.  Out  of 
the 78 French MEPs elected in 2004, our  
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study shows that 33% of men have been in 
leadership  positions  against  18%  of 
women; and, between June 2004 and July 
2007,  men  presented  an  average  of  2.3 
parliamentary  reports  against  1.9  for 
women,  equal  seniority  notwithstanding 
(2.0  mandates).  These  internal  variations 
illustrate the limits of legislative action in 
terms of promoting gender equality on all 
levels of political action. 
 
Although  these  gaps  are  the  result  of 
persistent  gender  inequality,  they  are 
nonetheless  also  attributable  to  the 
differential distribution of political capital 
between  men  and  women  (cf.  above).  In 
fact,  the  mode  of  involvement  and  the 
modalities of appropriation of the mandate 
are far from uniform, given that they vary 
widely  depending  on  the  social  and 
political  characteristics  of  female 
parliamentarians.  Thus,  female 
parliamentarians whose political paths lead 
directly to the centre of the political field 
(former  ministers  or  national 
parliamentarians, who are considered, and 
think of themselves first and foremost as 
“national”  representatives)  and  who 
generally seek a long-term position either 
in  the  National  Assembly  or  in  the 
government invest little into the European 
Parliament.  For  them,  it  is  specifically  a 
secondary  arena  (Michèle  Alliot-Marie, 
Roselyne Bachelot, and Elisabeth Guigou). 
In  these  cases,  the  European  mandate  is 
generally short, ranging from a few months 
to a few years, with frequent resignations 
owing  either  to  changeovers  between 
parties  or  parliamentary  elections.  Their 
actual presence in the European Parliament 
is  also  more  sporadic,  given  that 
parliamentary  activity  often  essentially 
consists of voting during plenary sessions. 
The actual practices of these female MEPs 
thus  tend  to  point  towards  forms  of 
amateurism  that  are  often  condemned  by 
the  more  engaged  women 
parliamentarians.  On  the  whole,  similar 
observations have been made about men. 
 
A different attitude is exhibited by female 
MEPs  who,  like  Catherine  Lalumière  or 
Simone  Veil,  are  equally  endowed  with 
political  capital  but  are  either  in  the 
twilight  of  their  career,  or  have  been 
marginalised by national institutions. Their 
positions  in  the  assembly  are  linked  to  a 
symbolic capital that is specific to men and 
women  who  dominate  and  who  have 
nothing  to  prove  in  order  to  exist  or  be 
recognised. This is all the more true when 
a European experience - such as European 
Commissioner,  or,  as  in  the  case  of 
Lalumière,  Secretary-General  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  –  complements  the 
political  capital  acquired  on  the  national 
field. In such cases, the postures adopted 
are not far removed from positions whose 
only real symbolism is the story they are 
meant to tell.   
 
However,  these  are  not  the  most 
characteristic  postures  of  female  MEPs. 
Indeed, a study of the modes of recruiting 
French  women  politicians  into  the 
European  Parliament  shows  a  relative 
weakness  of  their  social,  cultural 
(especially  educational),  as  well  as 
political  resources,  which  differentiates 
them  from  their  male  counterparts.  The 
over-involvement in roles can therefore be 
a  strategy  to  compensate  for  a  less 
favourable  parliamentary  and  European 
resource structure and political legitimacy. 
These  women  (Aline  Pailler,  Françoise 
Grossetête,  Marie-Claude  Vayssade)  are 
characterised  by  a  disposition  of 
“goodwill” towards the institution and its 
prescribed  roles.  Less  endowed  with 
political  properties,  and  less  prepared  by 
their  political  and  social  careers  to  deal 
with the functioning of political spaces and 
to master the expertise of “professionals of 
representation”,  many  female  MEPs 
present  themselves  as  “assiduous, 
industrious”  or  “studious”  workers.  They 
frequently  highlight  the  “time-consuming  
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nature  of  their  work”,  as  the  following 
example indicates:  
 
“When  you  come  here,  you  have  lots  of 
things to discover. Don’t come here thinking 
you’ll know everything in just one day. And 
you have to assert yourself, the French are 
not known for hard work, and so you have to 
assert  yourself  through  hard  work.  Here, 
you’ll have no problems if you work (…). I 
have worked really hard. No doubt about it. 
But I love my work. I never rest, I don’t stop; 
I work all the time.”
13 
 
This kind of involvement of MEPs can be 
seen  in  various  areas  depending  on  their 
personal  or  political  interests  in  various 
committees. This is because these forms of 
dedication  to  the  institution  and  over-
involvement  in  roles  on  the  part  of 
newcomers  to  the  political  scene  provide 
the opportunity to strengthen a sometimes 
fragile  legitimacy,  with  the  possibility  of 
recognition leading to leadership positions 
(e.g.,  the  group  vice-presidency  held  by 
Grossetête  before  2004,  or  the  EP 
presidency  held  by  Fontaine  during  the 
fifth  legislature).  These  forms  of 
dedication also afford true political credit, 
i.e., capital that is specific to the European 
Parliament, and is potentially transferable 
into the national political field – if only to 
the extent that it contributes to the renewal 
of  the  mandate.  Consequently,  the 
European parliamentary space can provide 
viable  alternative  paths  to  political 
professionalisation,  since  resources 
acquired  in  the  institution  turn  out  to  be 
useful in partisan contexts. In this regard, if 
one  goes  beyond  ideologically  negative 
opinions  –  characteristic,  for  example,  of 
far left-wing female MEPs whose refusal 
to  engage  in  the  parliamentary  game 
constitutes  a  type  of  management  of  the 
mandate  and  of  the  constraints  of 
representation – subjective relationships to 
the  institution  are  usually  positive,  since 
they  are  embedded  in  ascendant  political 
                                                 
13 Interview with a female MEP, quoted by Akrivou 
and Lyose, 1998. 
and  social  paths,  and  in  the  considerable 
symbolic  and  financial  rewards  provided 
by  the  EP’s  privileged  position  on  the 
periphery of the political arena. 
 
Hence,  the  political  approach  of  many 
women  appears  entrepreneurial  regarding 
social  spheres  beyond  the  political  arena, 
as  well  as  the  Parliament,  where 
involvements  are  strong  and  mainly 
directed  towards  secondary  or  less 
legitimate committees, which can however 
still  yield  high  political  dividends. 
Between  1979  and  2004,  French  female 
MEPs  were,  de  facto,  more  frequently 
found on less prestigious committees, such 
as:  Environment,  Internal  Market  and 
especially Employment and Social Affairs 
(14% against 3.5% for men) or Culture and 
Education  (11%  against  4%).
14  However, 
in  correlation  to  the  emergence  of  a 
European  space  of  public  policies,  the 
succession  of  treaties  and  the  appearance 
of new legislative procedures, the position 
of the EP in European policy-making has 
strengthened (Costa, 2001). Consequently, 
some  of  these  committees  (Environment, 
Industry,  Budgetary  Control  and  Internal 
Market)  help  to  reinvest  intellectual 
resources and aptitudes for the work. This 
is due to the fact that, although they are at 
the very core of the institution’s strategies 
– in terms of the actual configuration of the 
European  political  system  –  they  enable 
them to monitor issues, and to draft highly 
“technical”  reports  which  have  become 
increasingly  prestigious  from  the  late 
1980s.  As  a  result  of  the  procedures  of 
codecision  or  the  centralisation  of  issues 
linked to the budget, these committees and 
the topics they deal with are indeed at the 
heart  of  institutional  issues.
15  The  EP’s 
ability to produce technical expertise able 
                                                 
14 This is typical of practices characteristic of other 
political assemblies. See: Achin, 2005. 
15 See Georgakakis, 2000, on the standing of the EP 
and the Budget Control Committee during the crisis 
of the Commission in 1998-1999. 
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to  rival  that  of  the  Commission’s  in 
presumably  less  political  but  highly 
technical  areas,  is  in  fact  at  the  heart  of 
institutional  strategies.  In  the  same  vein, 
the  deepening  of  European  construction 
from 1986, and  especially in 1992, some 
real opportunities for acquiring a new type 
of political capital emerged for the actors 
who were socially and politically disposed 
to  “play  the  game”  and  to  be  highly 
involved  –  among  whom,  in  particular, 
there  were  many  women.  Consequently, 
the  history  of  the  institution  cannot  be 
entirely  separated  from  this  fusion 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  relatively 
unexpected  political  paths  in  a 
parliamentary level institution with a long-
standing deficit of legitimacy, and, on the 
other hand, very specific legal procedures 
(Beauvallet, 2007). 
 
The  parliamentary  practices  of  female 
MEPs  can  therefore  not  be  understood 
without taking into account their social and 
political  properties.  More  than  just  a 
characteristic  of  political  femininity,  as 
suggested in certain quarters, the forms of 
involvement in Europe must be considered 
especially in relation to the specificities of 
the political recruitment of women MEPs. 
These specificities produce processes that 
are  similar  for  men  and  women,  but  are 
amplified in the case of the latter. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The voting system for European elections 
in  France  up  until  2004  –  the  single 
constituency, proportional list system – has 
undoubtedly led to an increased openness 
for the recruitment of women into politics. 
This  constitutes  a  key  variable  in  the 
process.  However,  the  survey 
demonstrated  that  it  can  only  be 
understood  in  combination  with  the 
position of the European Parliament in the 
French political field, the inter- and intra-
partisan  struggles  to  change  the  rules  of 
political  recruitment;  or,  furthermore,  the 
issues  in  the  public  space  at  a  given 
moment. In France, the feminisation of the 
European  political  personnel  is  the  result 
of the special uses made by political actors 
in  European  elections  (especially  in  left-
wing  parties).  These  specific  uses  only 
make sense in the context of wider games 
within which they are involved. By using 
feminisation  as  a  means  for  singling  out 
the electoral supply – a strategy that was 
itself  made  possible  by  the  special 
structure  of  these  elections  –  as  well  as, 
within  the  same  parties,  as  a  means  for 
distinguishing  rival  aspirants,  all  actors 
facilitated the transformation of the norms 
of political selection, and contributed to the 
emergence  of  new  resources,  which  are 
particularly efficient for party list systems. 
 
However,  if  the  opening  of  a  new 
European  space  for  political  competition 
contributed to change the rules of the entire 
political field, this re-definition ultimately 
remained  incomplete  as  the  low 
representation  of  women  in  the  upper 
echelons of the political hierarchy shows, 
even after the law on parity was passed. In 
other  words,  changing  the  rules  of  the 
political game is more likely to affect the 
periphery of the field than the centre. 
 
At  the  European  level,  the  opening  of 
political liberalisation in favour of women 
resulted in the introduction of women with 
less  political  experience.  This  dimension 
therefore affects the transformation of the 
political  relationship  with  the  European 
mandate,  the  manner  it  is  perceived  and 
embodied  both  inside  and  outside  the 
assembly.  Formerly  considered  as 
“secondary”,  the  European  mandate  has 
progressively  established  itself  as  one  of 
primary  status,  which  entails  a  certain 
implied political “goodwill”. Furthermore, 
being less endowed with political capital, 
women  who  wish  to  remain  in  the 
European  Parliament  are  thus  more  often 
dependent on parties and political leaders.  
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Age distribution by gender and legislature of MEPs elected in France between 
1979 and 2004. 
Legislature  Sex  <40 years  40-49 years   50-59 years ns  >60 years   Total 
Men  4.4%  16.7%  32.2%  46.7%  100% (90)  First 
(1979-1984)  Women  21.7%  21.7%  30.4%  26.1%  100% (23) 
Men  6.0%  28.6%  28.6%  36.9%  100% (84)  Second 
(1984-1989)  Women  5.3%  47.4%  10.5%  36.8%  100% (19) 
Men   3.6%  41.0%  32.5%  22.9%  100% (83)  Third 
(1989-1994)   Women   14.3%  57.1%  23.8%  4.8%  100% (21) 
Men   2.6%  27.3%  48.1%  22.1%  100% (77)  Fourth 
(1994-1999)   Women  3.4%  37.9%  48.3%  10.3%  100% (29) 
Men   3.4%  19.0%  56.9%  20.7%  100% (58)  Fifth 
(1999-2004)   Women   4.9%  29.3%  51.2%  14.6%  100% (41) 
 
Table 2: Age distribution by political affiliation of MEPs elected in France between 1979 
and 2004.  
  <40 yrs  40-50 yrs  50-60 yrs  >60 yrs  Total 
Right  8% (4)  40% (20)  44% (22)  8% (4)  100% (50) 
Left   5% (2)  26% (11)  31% (13)  38% (16)  100% (42) 
All   6.5% (6)  33.5% (31)  38% (35)  21% (20)  100% (92) 
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Table 3: Distribution of original profession of MEPs elected in France between 1979 and 
2004 by gender and political affiliation. 
Profession  Women   Men  
  Left   Right   All   Left  Right  All 
  Number   %  Number   %  Number   %  Number   %  Number   %  Number   % 
Farmer  0  0%  2  5%  2  2%  5  5%  12  7%  17  6% 
Company director  0  0%  1  2.5%  1  1%  5  5%  23  14%  28  10% 
Liberal profession  4  8%  3  7%  7  7.5%  15  14%  21  12%  36  13% 
Private sector 
senior executive 
3  6%  6  14% 
9  10% 
8  7%  21  12% 
29  10,5% 
Senior civil servant  2  4%  3  7%  5  5.5%  9  8%  42  25%  51  18.5% 
Academic   5  10%  1  2.5%  6  6.5%  24  22%  10  6%  34  12.5% 
Public sector senior 
executive 
5  10%  1  2.5% 
6  6.5% 
3  3%  5  3% 
8  3% 
Secondary school 
teacher 
8  16%  2  5% 
10  11% 
11  10%  7  4% 
18  6.5% 
Journalist  4  8%  4  9.5%  8  8.5%  9  8%  7  4%  16  6% 
Artisan/trader  0  0%  0  0%  0  0%  0  0%  5  3%  5  2% 
Private sector 
middle-level 
executive 
1  2%  3  7% 
4  4.5% 
0  0%  4  2% 
4  1.5% 
Public sector 
middle-level 
executive 
1  2%  0  0% 
1  1% 
1  1%  1  1% 
2  0.5% 
Schoolteacher   5  10%  1  2.5%  6  6.5%  3  3%  1  1%  4  1.5% 
Paramedical 
(nurse…) 
0  0%  1  2.5% 
1  1% 
1  1%  0  0% 
1  0.5% 
White/blue collar 
worker 
6  12%  1  2.5% 
7  7.5% 
9  8%  3  2% 
12  4.5% 
Without profession  1  2%  1  2.5%  2  2.1%  1  1%  1  1%  2  0.5% 
Non Applicable  5  10%  12  28%  17  18.5%  5  4%  5  3%  10  3% 
All   50  100%  42  100%  92  100%  109  100%  168  100%  277  100% 
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Table 4: Social status indicator distribution by gender and political affiliation of MEPs 
elected in France between 1979 and 2004 (n=369). 
  Women   Men  
  Left  
(50) 
Right  
(42) 
All   
(92) 
Left  
(109) 
Right  
(168) 
All  
 (277) 
Originally  working  in  the  private 
sector 
38% (19)  48% (20)  42% 
(39) 
42% (46)  56% (95)  51% (141) 
Originally from working class  12% (6)  2.5% (1)  8% (7)  8% (9)  1% (2)  4% (11) 
Post-graduate certificate  44% (22)  33% (14)  39% 
(36) 
61% (66)  51% (85)  55% (151) 
Doctorate degree  22% (11)  12% (5)  17% 
(16) 
33% (36)  15% (25)  22% (61) 
 
Table 5: Political path indicators of MEPs elected in France between 1979 and 2004 by 
gender and political affiliation. 
  Women    Men  
  Left  
(50) 
Right  
 (42) 
All   
(92) 
Left  
(109) 
Right  
(168) 
All  
 (277) 
Minister  10% (5)  19% (8)  14% 
(13) 
15% (17)  23% (39)  20% (56) 
Parliamentarian   12% (6)  19% (8)  15% 
(14) 
36% (39)  46% (77)  42% (116) 
Regional councillor  24% (12)  33% (14)  28% 
(26) 
38% (41)  45% (76)  42% (117) 
General councillor  14% (7)  21,5% (9)  17% 
(16) 
31% (34)  38% (63)  35% (97) 
Mayor  16% (8)  7% (3)  12% 
(11) 
30% (33)  35% (59)  33% (92) 
First political appointment  49% (24)  17% (7)  23% 
(21) 
41% (44)  19% (32)  27% (76) 
First  political  appointment  and 
mandate as MEP 
6% (3)  19% (8)  12% 
(11) 
2% (2)  8% (13)  5% (15) 
First  appointment  in  a 
political/administrative cabinet 
10% (5)  19% (8)  14% 
(13) 
11% (12)  20% (34)  17% (46) 
 
Table 6: Gender distribution of MEPs elected in France between 1979 and 2004 (n=369) 
by legislature. 
Legislature  1979-1984  1984-1989  1989-1994  1994-1999  1999-2004 
Men  77,5%  81%  77%  73%  59% 
Women  22,5%  19%  23%  27%  41% 
 
Table  7:  Variations  by  gender  in  educational  properties  of  MEPs  elected  in  France 
between 1979 and 2004 (n=369). 
  IEP  Graduate school  Doctorate  5 years of higher 
education 
3-4 years of 
higher 
education 
Men  22,5%  31%  22%  55%  21,5% 
Women  12%  15%  17%  38,5%  31% 
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Table 8: Variations by gender in the mandates held by MEPs elected in France between 
1979 and 2004, before their election to the European Parliament. 
  Minister  Deputy  Mayor  General 
councillor 
Regional 
councillor 
Municipal 
councillor/de
puty mayor 
National + 
local 
Men  20%  42%  33%  35%  42,5%  33,5%  39,5% 
Women  14%  15%  11,5%  17%  29,5%  44,5%  16% 
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